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THE LIMITATION ON POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES: A DISCORDANT NOTE IN
THE LAW OF CHARITIESt
Elias Clark*
THE twentieth century has seen the emergence of philanthropy
as an institution of vast wealth and of far-reaching influence on
the spiritual, cultural, intellectual, and physical life of American society.
The private donor has been the architect of this development. He
selects, in accordance with his own estimate of the public interest, the
purposes to be served, and regulates the extent and duration of that
service by the flow of his wealth. For its part in the process, government
has played the indulgent parent, encouraging, subsidizing but rarely
interfering except to forestall the grossest excesses. Society has no cause
to complain. It has been repaid incalculable dividends for the privileges
granted. Nevertheless, donor autonomy sustains a system which is
something less than perfect in that all funds are not put to useful service.
Some are dissipated on trivial or obsolete ventures, others remain in-
active, and overall there is attrition through scatteration of insufficient
funds among an infinite variety of purposes." Could a more precise set
of legal controls, assigning to government a greater responsibility in the
shaping of charitable purposes, achieve a more efficient utilization of
our philanthropic resources?
t The writer wishes to express his appreciation to the University of Wisconsin Law
School, the Ford Foundation, and Professor Richard V. Effland of the University
of Wisconsin for the opportunity to have participated in a seminar on charitable
trusts and foundations during the summer of 1958. While the ideas expressed here-
in are the writer's own, he would like to express his gratitude to his colleagues
in that venture for the interchange of ideas concerning the influence of law on
modern charity. In addition, the writer would like to thank Mrs. Jane Stern of
the New York Bar for her assistance in collecting the material for this article.
* Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B., 1943, LL.B., 1947, Yale University. Mem-
ber, Connecticut and New York Bars.
1. Several states have conducted surveys as to the volume of neglected and dormant
charitable funds within their respective jurisdictions. For a summary of results see
TAYLOR, PUBLIc AccouNTABILITY OF FomNDATIoNs AND CHARITABLE TRusTs 9-49 (1953);
BOGERT, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 MicH. L. Rv.
633, 639-49 (1954). While these surveys were designed to expose deficiencies in existing
enforcement procedures, they illustrate as well the dangers of loss which result when
donors are given free rein to establish charitable purposes.
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One approach to this question is to examine an area in which a sub-
stantial measure of control has been tried. The Internal Revenue Code
witholds the bountiful blessings of exemptions and tax-free contributions
from any charity which engages, as a substantial part of its program, in
political activities.2 This restriction is well adapted to a case study on
the feasibility of legal controls. It is practically the only one which
is applied without reference to whether the end result is beneficial or
inimical to the interests of society.3 Its unique position stands out in
bold relief when contrasted with the traditional attitudes toward using
law as an instrument to control charities.
THE DEFINITION OF CHARITY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CONTROL
The definition of charity is the key to control. No one doubts that
a redefinition of the conditions under which government would grant
tax immunity, perpetual existence, and the machinery for enforcement
could effect a dramatic change in the character of philanthropy. That
the law to date has not been disposed to undertake any such responsi-
bility is immediately apparent from an examination of existing definitions.
The usual formulation traces from the Statute of Elizabeth and includes
as its basic components the relief of poverty and the promotion of
religion, education, or other public purposes.4 Alternative tests speak
2. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
3. All of the traditional charitable purposes are justified in terms to benefit to
society. There is, however, one further qualification which should perhaps be made.
Both property and tax law deny charitable status to a purpose which is selfish or
designed to return a profit even though that purpose might also be of some benefit
to the community. 4 ScoTr, TRusTS § 376 (2d ed. 1956); INT. Rav. CoDE oF 1954, § 501-
(c) (3). In addition, the Code prohibits certain types of administrative activities:
§ 502 (feeder organizations); § 503 (prohibited transactions including loans without
adequate security or interest, excessive compensation, making services available on a
preferential basis, purchasing property at a price which exceeds its value, selling prop-
erty at a price under its value, and diversion of property to a private person or cor-
poration); § 504 (unreasonable accumulations of income or diversion to noncharitable
activities); and §§ 511-14 (unrelated business income and business leases). It is sub-
mitted that these restrictions on certain administrative practices do not go to the
essence of the charitable nature of the enterprise, in the same manner as the limitation
on political activities.
4. The Statute of Elizabeth, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (repealed). Justice Gray was the
author of a more ornate formulation of these traditional categories of charity:
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of educa-
tion or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,
by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining
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with even greater generality: "anything that tends to promote well-
doing and well-being of social man," 5 "improvement and promotion of
the happiness of mankind," 1 or "social interest to the community," 7 to
mention but a few.
Words such as "religion," "education," and "poverty" provide a
minimum opportunity for control because they include within their
meanings possibilities of endless variation." Admittedly, each has a
central core of meaning permitting general agreement as to charitable
purposes which most certainly qualify. Their utility stops, however,
when we try to use them as words of exclusion. Before "religion," for
example, can be applied to keep out the nonreligious, there must be
some agreement as to those human activities which are considered
essential to religion. Two recent cases have held that congregational
activities are religious even though the members of the congregation
were not united in a common belief in a Supreme Being.9 These cases
are not cited to criticize the result, but rather to indicate the difficulties
public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867).
This definition continues to be popular. A sampling of recent cases in which it
has been invoked includes: In re Estate of Small, 244 Iowa 1209, 1220, 58 N.W.2d 277,
482 (1953) (trust upheld as charitable when the trustees were to distribute the income
to persons and purposes as directed by God the Father, Jesus Christ the Son, and
the Holy Spirit, and as the trustees believe would have been acceptable to the testa-
tor); People ex rel. Marsters v. Reverend Saletyni Missionaries, Inc, 409 Ill. 370, 377,
99 N.E.2d 186, 190 (1951) (seminary to educate students and conduct retreats tax
exempt); State v. Union Trust Co, 227 Ind. 571, 576, 86 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1949) (trust
for the publication of grandfather's diaries not charitable); Henderson v. Troy Bank
& Trust Co., 250 Ala. 456, 466, 34 So. 2d 835, 841 (1948) (financing of schools and
hospital for crippled children held charitable); In re Swayze's Estate, 120 Mont. 546, 552,
191 P.2d 322, 325-26 (1948) (trust to establish a hotel as a memorial to testatrix not
charitable).
5. Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877) (hospital for
foundlings charitable); Smith v. United States Natl Bank, 120 Colo. 167, 180-81, 207
P.2d 1194, 1200 (1949) (public, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses held chari-
table); Bader Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 358 Mo. 747, 752, 217
S.W.2d 489, 492 (1949) (slum clearance held charitable).
6. Houston v. Mills Memorial Home, Inc., 202 Ga. 540, 545, 43 S.E.2d 680, 684 (1947)
(old folks home held charitable).
7. Allison v. Mennonite Publications Bd., 123 F. Supp. 23, 27 (W.D. Pa. 1954)
(nonprofit corporation established to own church publication house not entitled to
charitable immunity).
8. For an incisive analysis of ambiguities in legal definitions see Williams, Language
and the Law-l, 61 L.Q. Rev. 179 (1945).
9. Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d
394 (1957).
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which courts have in moving from the abstract to the specific. In each
case the one referrant which would give the religious category a degree
of precision was rejected. Similar influences have shaped the other
categories. Education is not confined to the classroom, 10 poverty de-
pends upon circumstances," and public purposes include anything useful
which is not covered in the other categories.' 2
The test of charity was not always so flexible. In England as the
concept of charity evolved, the donor's intent was sometimes subordi-
nated to the paramount interests of the Crown.'3 Even today the English
law appears to exercise a tighter control than does ours.'4 The trend
of American law away from the parent authority has not been by ac-
cident. The courts have consciously refused to narrow the categories
of charity because they recognize their own inability to delimit the
10. See, e.g., In re Los Angeles Pioneer Soc'y, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 859, 257 P.2d 1, 5 (1953)
(trust for preservation and collection of historical data).
11. See, e.g., Raser v. Johnson, 9 Ill. App. 2d 375, 383, 132 N.E.2d 819, 823 (1956)
(trust to pay for hospitalization and medical supplies of worthy persons who, in judgment
of trustee, were unable to pay for them); Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York Community,
Trust, 141 N.J. Eq. 238, 56 A.2d 907 (1948) (trust for distributing footwear to needy
actors as determined by actors' association).
12. See, e.g., In re Estate of Graves, 242 Il. 23, 28-29, 89 N.E. 672, 674 (1909) (be-
quest for erection of drinking fountain for horses and life-sized monument of testator's
race horse a charitable gift); In the Matter of Estate of Scanlon, 230 Ill. App. 505 (1923)
(trust for establishing and maintaining public bathhouse a charitable gift).
13. The principal instrument of control was the doctrine of prerogative cy pres
which could be applied without reference to the donor's intent. The classic example
of this doctrine is Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 228, 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754), where
a Jewish testator left money in trust for the support of an assembly for reading Jewish
law and instructing persons in the Jewish religion. The trust was declared void as
against public policy, and the money went to a foundling home where it was used
to support a Christian minister and to instruct children in the Christian religion. See
Comment, A Revalution of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303 (1939).
14. Several recent English cases have withheld charitable status from purposes which
seem to be clearly acceptable under American law. Oppenheim v. Tobacco Secs.
Trust Co., [19511 A.C. 297 (1950) (trust for the education of children of employees of
a company which employed over 110,000 persons held not charitable); Gilmour v.
Coats, [1949] A.C. 426 (Roman Catholic contemplative community held not charitable).
Another area for contrast is the construction given to the word "benevolent." English
authority continues to treat it as broader than charitable, see Chichester Diocesan Fund
v. Simpson, [19441 A.C. 341 (trust for charitable or benevolent objects in England
held void for uncertainty), while most American authority construes the word as
synonymous with "charitable." 4 ScoTT, TRUsts § 398.1 (2d ed. 1956). For a discussion
of the English definition of charity see Brunyate, The Legal Definition of Charity, 61
L.Q. REv. 268 (1945). In 1952 a commission recommended that the definition of
charity be modernized to allow flexibility of interpretation but that the existing
case law on the subject be preserved. Committee on Law and Practice, Report Relating
to Charitable Trusts, CMO. No. 8710, 31-36 (1952) (Nathan Report).
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ways in which society might be served. Charity is in constant flux,
varying with the place and times. The dangers perceived in judicial
definitions of charity are that the prejudices of today will inhibit the
growth and change necessary to meet the demands of future generations.
So it is that the donor is given free rein to chart the course of charitable
objectives. Courts, while frequently suggesting that the funds might
well have been put to better use, accept as charitable those generally
beneficial purposes which are not affirmatively absurd, obscene, illegal,
excessively selfish, or specifically offensive to some considerable segment
of the population. 15
For the most part the issue comes up within a context in which
society's interest appears minimal. A donor has died, and the court
must choose between approving a questionable purpose or awarding
the property to heirs whom the testator had pro tanto disinherited. The
judge's decision is obvious. He believes that the concept of private
property entitles the owner to dictate the future disposition of that
property, he wants to encourage charity, and he knows that if he errs
on the side of leniency, cy pres may be invoked at a later date in favor
of a more practical use of the property.
The responsibility of the decision-maker is more complex when the
issue involves tax privileges. The community has a stake in enterprises
which are to receive governmental subsidy. And if control is the ob-
jective, the manipulation of exemptions can effect an immediate influence
on the channelling of private funds into high priority areas.' 6 The
federal courts recognize an authority in the tax field independent of
15. This writer has used this description of the process on a previous occasion.
While it contains its share of ambiguities, it has the advantage of indicating that the
initial presumption is one of validity. Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 998 n.72 (1957). A more
complete statement requires a listing of ad hoc responses to particular situations. As
Professor Scott has said: "The truth of the matter is that it is impossible to frame a
perfect definition of charitable purposes. There is no fixed standard to determine
what purposes are charitable." 4 ScoTrt, TRUSTs § 368, at 2629 (2d ed. 1956). Cf.
Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525 (1958).
Statements frequently appear in the cases to the effect that the judge's personal ap-
praisal of the wisdom or utility of the trust is irrelevant. See ZOLLMANN, AMERIC As
LAW oF CHARITIES 148-49 (1924).
16. The Code presently encourages gifts to certain high priority charities. The
charitable deduction is limited to 20% of adjusted gross income. If, however, at least
10% of such income is given to a church, educational institution, or hospital, then the
outer limit of the total deduction is increased to 30% of adjusted gross income. INr.
REv. CODE oF 1954, 5 170(b) (1) (B).
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local law characterizations, 17 but this authority is rarely invoked. The
statutory definitions of charity are broad, and federal judges have no
more desire to act as censors than their state court colleagues.
Property and tax law are in harmony except in one important par-
ticular. The former permits political activities in pursuit of charitable
objectives,' s while the latter makes such activities the basis for denying
charitable tax privileges. Implicit in these results is a fundamental dif-
ference in attitude toward the regulation of charities. The limitation
on political activities affects any charity which must, through the force
of circumstances, resort to governmental assistance to achieve its ends.
No inquiry is permitted into benefits which may thereby be bestowed.
The one exception, based upon the substantiality of the activity, per-
mits a quantitative rather than a qualitative discrimination. The general
law of charity, in effect, presumes a purpose to be charitable unless
affirmatively shown to be inimical to the interests of society. The politi-
cal activities rule not only reverses this inference, but also goes a step
beyond by making a showing of substantial activity conclusive grounds
for refusing charitable status.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIMITATION ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The income tax of 1894 included an exemption for any corporation
or association organized exclusively for religious, educational, or charita-
ble purposes.' While this statute was later written off as unconstitu-
tional, 0 many of its provisions survived as prototypes for subsequent
legislation. Specifically, the exemption was repeated in the 1913 act
2 l
and from that point became a permanent fixture in the tax law. In
1917 the correlative provision permitting the taxpayer to deduct a
17. Cases in which local law was held not to be determinative of taxability include:
Sharpe's Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1945); Federal Reserve Bank
v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 45 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931);
Eagan v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930), reversing 17 B.T.A. 694 (1929);
Greiss v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. El. 1956). On the other hand, cases
in which local law has influenced taxability include: Schoellkopf v. United States, 124
F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1942); Howell v. Dudley, 154 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Estate
of Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97 (1943); Estate of Agnes C. Robinson, 1 T.C. 19 (1942),
acq., 1943 Cum. BuLTz 19.
18. See authorities cited note 44 infra.
19. 28 Star. 556 (1894). For a discussion of the early history of federal tax exemp-
tions see Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525
(1958).
20. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
21. 38 Stat. 172 (1913) (now INT. Rav. CoDE op 1954, § 501).
[Vol. 46:439
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contribution from his personal income tax was enacted,22 again with
the qualification that the recipient be exclusively organized for religious,
educational, or charitable purposes. A similar deduction was added to
the estate tax2 3 in 192624 and to the gift tax which, after an interim
period of validity from 1924 to 1926,25 became a permanent part of
the tax law in 1932.6 Prior to 1934 none of these statutes made direct
reference to political activity. It was, however, recognized both in the
regulations and decisions that such activity was grounds for denying
the exemptionY.2  Authority on the point was sufficiently settled so that
in 1934 when the prohibition was put into the statute,28 there was no
discernible change in the flow of decisions.
The statutory language as it appears today in section 501 (c) (3)
qualifies a charitable corporation, chest, fund, or foundation for exemp-
tion from corporate taxes if "no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legisla-
tion, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of any candidate for public office." Similar language, except
for omission of the clause about political campaigns and candidates,
appears in section 170, setting out the deductibility of charitable gifts,
and in comparable sections of the estate and gift taxes.
2 9
From the practical point of view, charities are not very much con-
cerned about their own taxes. They may, under existing law, organize
as civic associations, engage in political activities, and retain their
exemption from corporate taxes.30 It is, however, vital that they qualify
22. 40 Star. 330 (1917) (now IN'T. REv. CODE or 1954, § 170).
23. 39 Star. 777 (1916).
24. 44 Star. 835 (1926) (now INwr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a)).
25. 43 Stat. 313, 314 (1924).
26. 47 Stat. 245, 247-48 (1932) (now Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2522).
27. See notes 32-37 infra and accompanying text.
28. 48 Star. 690, 700, 755, 760 (1934) (income tax, exempt corporations, estate tax,
and gift tax, respectively).
29. The clause concerning participation in political campaigns was added to the
Revenue Bill of 1954 by way of amendment introduced on the Senate floor by
Senator Johnson. No explanation was given for this addition. 100 CONG. REC. 9604
(1954). In addition to §§ 170 and 501(c) (3) of the income tax, the restriction on
political activities also appears in § 2055 (a) (3) (estate tax deduction) and § 2522 (a) (2)
(gift tax deduction). A number of states impose a similar limitation on contributions
made by individuals. See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 17214(b); N.Y. TAx LAws
§ 360(10) (b).
30. -rr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(4). See Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v.
19601
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as exempt charities in order that donors may deduct contributions made
to them."1
It is not clear from the early history of the restriction on political
activities whether it evolved as a result of carefully considered policy,
or of the Treasury's understandable desire to place outer limits around
any exemption, or on the assumption that established property law re-
quired it. The principle first appeared in the regulations of 1919 and
was primarily aimed at "controversial" political activity.3 During the
twenties it was successfully applied in several minor cases before the
Board of Tax Appeals. 33 In 1930 it moved center stage. The case was
Slee v. Commissioner,34 involving the deductibility of gifts to the
American Birth Control League. Judge Learned Hand, writing for a
unanimous court, held that the clinical activities of the League were
charitable. The Board of Tax Appeals had held, however, that the
League's agitation for repeal of birth control laws put the League out-
side charitable status. Judge Hand agreed. He placed little emphasis
on the controversial nature of the issue, suggesting that the political
aims of the League might be both right and commendable. The deduc-
tion must, nevertheless, be disallowed because:
Political agitation as such is outside the statute, however innocent
the aim, though it adds nothing to dub it "propaganda," a polemical
word used to decry the publicity of the other side. Controversies
of that sort must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury
stands aside from them.
36
The decision in the Slee case has served as the cornerstone for all
that has followed. Later courts have accepted the principle as settled,
Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945) (association organized to conduct a free
public radio forum for dissemination of liberal and progressive social views is exempt).
31. For the applicable deduction provisions see INT. Riv. CoDE OF 1954, § 170(c) (2)-
(D) (income tax); § 2055(a) (2)-(3) (estate tax); § 2522(a) (2) (gift tax).
32. "But associations formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are
not educational within the meaning of the statute." Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517 (1919), in
TD. 2831, 21 TREAS. DEcs. Ir. REv. 285 (1920).
33. See, e.g., Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1927) (evidence indicated that Scientific
Temperance Fed'n, Massachusetts Anti-Saloon League, Massachusetts Anti-Cigarette
League, and International Reform Bureau were formed to disseminate controversial
propaganda); Sophia G. Coxe, 5 B.T.A. 261 (1926), acq., VI-1 CuM. BULL. 2 (1927)
(League to Enforce Peace not exclusively charitable).
34. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930), 72 A.L.R. 400 (1931).
35. J. Noah H. Slee, 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929).
36. Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).
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and have seldom inquired as to whether it is well-founded in policy. 7
In retrospect it may be suggested that this deference is due more to
the decision's primacy in the field, as well as the eloquence and illustrious
name of its author, than to the cogency of its argument. The decision
actually assumes the validity of the restriction without attempting to
justify it by argument or authority.
Shortly thereafter, in 1934, the restriction became part of the statute.3 8
In view of the existing case law on the subject, it is not clear what the
proponents of the legislation sought to accomplish. One view holds that
the statute was designed to liberalize the case law. 9 The theory that
the legislation was narrowly conceived finds support in the debates. It
appears that the proponents wanted to restrict political agitation, sel-
fishly motivated, to secure some personal interests of the donor.40 No
mention is made of political activities being inherently improper. The
all inclusive proscription resulted, as the debates make clear, not from
broad policy considerations, but from the draftsmen's inability to frame
a more selective formula.4 '
One explanation for the ready acceptance of the limitation during
this formative period may perhaps be found in an erroneous assumption
that the general law of charities required such a result. This view would
have found support in two prominent Massachusetts decisions. In the
first, Jackson v. Phillips,4 2 decided in 1867, the court held that a trust
to promote "women's rights" was not charitable. Justice Gray, equating
women's rights with the suffragette movement, stated that the court's
duty was to expound the laws as they stand and not to assist in "the
overthrowing or changing of them" by accepting a political purpose
as charitable. The second decision, coming fifty-five years later and
37. See, e.g., Sharpe's Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1945); Marshall
v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 872 (1945).
38. See note 28 supra.
39. "They [the courts] have also applied the principle, that the section being
remedial must be liberally construed." Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 910
(6th Cir. 1955).
40. Senator Reed said of the bill: "There is no reason in the world why a contribu-
tion made to the National Economy League should be deductible as if it were a charita-
ble contribution if it is a selfish one made to advance the interests of the giver of the
money. That is what the committee was trying to reach . .. "' 78 CoNG. Rac. 5861
(1934).
41. Senator Reed's remarks continue: "[Wie found great difficulty in phrasing
the amendment. I do not reproach the draftsmen. I think we gave them an impossible
task; but this amendment goes further than the committee intended to go." Ibid.
42. 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
19601
HeinOnline -- 46 Va. L. Rev.  447 1960
448 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 46:439
involving an identical disposition, found the court no more prepared
than its predecessor to give the women their due.43 On the earlier
authority the purpose was held noncharitable. By way of demonstrat-
ing the prejudices of the place and times, the first case also involved a
trust for the abolition of Negro slavery, and the second a trust for the
promotion of temperance; neither court had any difficulty in finding
these trusts nonpolitical.
The courts of other jurisdictions have refused to be persuaded by
Justice Gray's opinion, and the commentators now suggest that the
Massachusetts approach is pretty much of a dead letter.44 The reasoning
of these decisions is in dramatic contrast to the tax cases. In language
varying to fit the specific facts of the case, each makes the point that an
appeal to political institutions to improve the lot of mankind is entirely
consistent with a broad and dynamic conception of charity.
By the time a few of the tax cases began to take note of this line of
authority, it was too late to effect a change. The Slee decision and the
1934 legislation foreclosed debate, leaving to subsequent decisions only
43. Bowditch v. Attorney Gen., 241 Mass. 168, 134 N.E. 796 (1922), 28 A.L.R. 713
(1924).
44. "The trend of modem authority has been toward the upholding of trusts which
have for their object the creation of a more enlightened public opinion, with a
consequent change in laws having to do with human relations and rights in a republic
such as ours ... ." Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 650, 266 Pac. 526, 529 (1928). "To
hold that an endeavor to procure, by proper means, a change in a law is, in effect, to
attempt to violate that law would discourage improvement in legislation and tend
to compel us to continue indefinitely to live under laws designed for an entirely dif-
ferent state of society." Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 199-200, 116 Ad. 826, 828 (1922).
"But even though a constitutional amendment be necessary . . . we see no reason for
holding that the advocacy of a change of the organic law . . . can be held as against
public policy." Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402, 413 (1898). Professor Scott states:
"In the United States the notion that a trust for a purpose otherwise charitable is not
charitable if the accomplishment of its purpose involves a change in existing laws has
been pretty thoroughly rejected." 4 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 374.4, at 2677 (2d ed. 1956). But
see Reiling, Federal Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525
(1958).
English authority coincides with the Massachusetts approach. "[A] trust for the
attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal ...
but because the Court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the
law will or will not be for a public benefit .... " Bowman v. Secular Soc'y, Ltd.,
[1917] A.C. 406, 442. See also National Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. Inland Revenue
Comm'rs, [1948] A.C. 31 (1947); Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Temperance
Council, 42 T.L.R. 618, 136 L.T. 27 (1926). It should be noted that American au-
thority does not sustain, as charitable, trusts for political parties. See Boorse Trust,
64 Pa. D. & C. 447 (Orphans' Ct. 1948); In re Grossman's Estate, 190 Misc. 521, 75
N.Y.S.2d 335 (Surr. Ct. 1947); cf. Liapis Estate, 88 Pa.D. & C. 303 (Orphan's Ct. 1954).
The distinction is not always easily made. See 4 Scorr, TRusts § 374.6 (2d ed. 1956).
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the responsibility for defining the circumstances under which the limita-
don was to be applied. Without attempting a detailed analysis of the
cases, several generalizations may be made concerning judicial attitudes
toward the type and quantum of activity necessary to justify withhold-
ing tax privileges.45 Judge Hand had made it clear that the fatal flaw in
the Slee case was that the League's political agitation was aimed at
repeal of all laws which prevented the use of contraceptive devices,
rather than being confined to relieving its own medical activities from
specific legal obstacles. Under his theory political activities which
are ancillary to some primary, nonpolitical objective are permissible. His
examples included a society to prevent cruelty to children or animals,
a state university, and an association of booklovers or scientists resorting
to positive support of law to accomplish their ends.
46
The 1934 legislation took a slightly different tack by prohibiting only
"substantial" participation. The test of substantiality under the statute
was not to weigh the amount of political activity standing alone, but
rather to balance that activity against the nonpolitical activities of the
group. Because the word "substantial" lacks precise content, the courts
have been able to invoke it to liberalize the overall restriction. In
particular, the taxpayer scored a notable triumph in the 1955 case of
Seasongood v. Conmissioner 7 The issue involved the deductibility
of contributions to the Hamilton County Good Government League,
an association designed to improve local government by group dis-
cussions, distribution of literature, investigation of legislation, represen-
tations to legislative authorities concerning proposed statutes, and en-
dorsement of candidates. This was enough to convince the Tax Court
that the deductions should not be allowed.4 In reversing, the Sixth
Circuit limited the scope of tainted political activity to direct appeals to
legislative and executive authorities and the support of candidates;
general public campaigns for better government constituted permissible
45. For a general review of the relevant cases see Note, Income Tax Disadvantages
of Political Activities, 57 CoLUm. L. REv. 273 (1957); Note, Charitable Trusts for
Political Purposes, 37 VA. L. REv. 988 (1951). See also 1956 Wis. L. REv. 165; 67 HARV.
L. REv. 1408 (1954). While the Slee case has had the predominant influence in the
field, some courts have seen the problem differently. See, e.g., International Reform
Fed'n v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 131 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 693 (1942); Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.
1941); Cochran v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1935).
46. Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).
47. 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
48. Murray Seasongood, 22 T.C. 671 (1954), acq., 1954-2 Cuam. BuLL. 5.
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educational activity. Inasmuch as the League spent less than five per
cent of its time and energies on direct action, it followed that this
activity was "insubstantial" and that the League qualified as a charity.
To other charities similarly involved in legislative activities, this in-
terpretation seemed to make life immeasurably easier. Direct political
action, if for no other reason than that state legislatures convene only
periodically, is invariably subordinated to general public education.
While the Treasury was not expected to acquiesce in the ruling, organ-
izations looked upon the Seasongood decision as a protective haven. It
was widely assumed that in future litigation the Treasury would have
to distinguish or repudiate the distinction drawn there between direct
action and public education. Throughout this later period, other groups
sought accommodation with the restriction by separating their organ-
izations into two entities, one for political action and the other for
research and general education. Under this procedure charitable status
was claimed for only the latter branch. It has not always been clear that
in the disbursement of the tax-free contributions thus collected the
separation of the two entities has been strictly observed.
In 1958 the era of relaxed good feeling seemed to come abruptly
to an end. The Treasury was reported to have adopted a more literal,
and therefore more aggressive, attitude toward the administration of
the statutory prohibitions against political activity.49 Approximately
fifty organizations lost the deductibility-of-contributions advantage as
opposed to less than twenty the year before. 50 Citizens groups seeking
exemptions for the first time met with a hostile reception although they
could frequently cite analogous organizations, processed in previous
years, which had been favorably treated. Other organizations, such as
citizens groups in support of slum clearance and mental health associa-
tions, were questioned and sometimes felt compelled to change their
charters and programs to meet objections. The Ford Foundation was
reported to have been considering a substantial grant to a civic planning
organization but channelled the funds to a university instead.5 It was
believed that this flurry of activity was designed to set the stage for
new, more restrictive regulations covering the entire field of political
activity. One widely circulated rumor had it that "education," the
49. Grimes, Tax Crackdowzn, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1958, p. 1, col. 6.
50. Ibid. The statistics give no breakdown as to whether political activity was the
reason for loss of tax advantages. It is, however, a fair assumption that it was significant
in many of the cases.
51. Ibid.
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category by which charities customarily excused their political activity,
was to be redefined in terms of classrooms, teachers, and pupils.
With the publication of the final regulations in early 1959, all of these
fears and fantasies were dispelled.2 The regulations proved to be
reasonable distillations of existing law without revolutionary innova-
tion. Thus, taxation is dependent on whether the group is operating
as an "action" organization. This category includes: (1) an organization
which devotes a substantial part of its activities to influencing legislation
by contacting, or urging the public to contact, governmental officials,
or advocating the adoption or rejection of legislation; (2) an organiza-
tion which participates in political campaigns or supports candidates;
(3) an organization whose primary objectives can only be attained by
legislation." The regulations are instructive on several other related
points. Exempt purposes are described by way of the traditional listing
of charitable objectives, followed by the statement that such enumeration
is not intended to bar other purposes "which may fall within the broad
outlines of 'charity' as developed by judicial decisions." 54 Educational
purposes are expressly defined to include "instruction of the public on
subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." 55
Furthermore, such public instruction may take a point of view so long
as the presentation is sufficiently objective to allow members of the
public to make an independent judgment.
50
The impact of these regulations on future developments cannot now
be foretold. The retention of broad definitions of charity and educa-
tion would seem to represent a substantial setback to those who would
use the tax exemption as an instrument for the tighter control of phil-
anthropic giving. On the other hand, prohibited political activity in-
cludes not only direct contacts with legislatures but also general educa-
tion urging the public to contact, and in this regard, would appear, to
represent a retreat from the extreme liberality of the Seasongood hold-
ing. Most significantly, no attempt has been made to give any quantita-
tive content to the key word "substantial." In short, these regulations
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (1959). For an analysis of these regulations see
Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions for Lobbying Ex-
penditures, 39 B.U.L. REv. 365, 386-90 (1959). See also Note, Deductibility of Ex-
penses To Influence Legislation, 46 VA. L. REv. 112 (1960).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (1959).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(d) (2) (1959).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(d) (3) (i) (b) (1959).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(d) (3) (i) (1959).
1960]
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are not the final answer. The tests are sufficiently broad to permit
either a relaxed or a strict administration depending upon whichever
way the Treasury wishes to throw the switch.
This brief history is significant for its failure to reveal any justification
for the restriction in its present, all-pervasive form. At no point is
the argument advanced that charity and politics are inherently incom-
patible. The restriction originated as a device to withhold tax subsidies
from controversial and selfish purposes. That it presently goes far
beyond these narrow limits is due to considerations of administrative
convenience rather than substantive policy. The qualification of sub-
stantiality is an admission that the restriction overreaches its objectives.
It does not, however, provide a basis for selection in terms relevant to
the best interests of society.
Those who would leave the law unchanged argue that no affirmative
reasons have been given for subsidizing political activities. This is to
state the problem unfairly. Tax privileges are granted broadly to an
infinite variety of purposes. The burden is upon those who would make
political activities in aid of charity an exception to the general rule.
Considerations of the practical effects of the restriction demonstrate
the difficulties which are involved in sustaining this burden.
THE RESTRICTIoN AS SEEN FROM SEVERAL PO=NTS OF Vmw
A. The Charities Involved
To the charities who find themselves under the gun the restriction
appears indefensible. Charity is not abstract theorizing, removed from
the everyday affairs of mankind. Religion, education, and the arts seek
in differing ways to condition human conduct to the end that society
will be improved. Each has its own agency, be it a congregation, student
body, or art patrons, by which its influence is communicated. The
charity which is concerned with governmental issues sees itself as not
dissimilar. Its members are no less dedicated or benevolently motivated
in their desire to serve mankind. It finds itself, however, subject to
penalty because its message is aimed at the one agency, government
in all its forms, which can effect the most immediate solution to society's
problems.
A fuller understanding of this viewpoint requires identification of
the groups involved. The primary targets of the present law are the
citizens groups who support a cause which can only be fully attained
[Vol. 46:439
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with the aid of governmental processes. These groups start out with an
initial disadvantage which perhaps helps to explain why they are singled
out from all other charities for unfavorable tax treatment. They are,
to a degree, pressure groups and, as such, are made to suffer in the
public eye some of the stigma attached to that term.'T But the image of
grasping manipulators using devious and secret means to extort selfish
advantage is misapplied. The groups under discussion have as a common
characteristic some recognized charitable purpose as their end. Only
the means used to achieve those ends are being brought into question.
On this basis they are immediately distinguishable from the economic
pressure group which seeks private gain or preferred treatment, the
hate group which seeks antisocial ends, or the political party or group
in support of a candidate which seeks political position and power.
Reliable statistics as to numbers and types of groups which might
fall into the charitable category are not available. We know that they
are numerous and influential at all levels of governmental activity. For
purposes of description these groups may be divided into two broad
categories. The first includes organizations seeking the solution to a
specific social problem: citizens for better public education, the care
and treatment of the mentally ill, urban redevelopment and slum
clearance, eradication of juvenile delinquency, relief of poverty, homes
for the aged, rehabilitation of the alcoholics and addicted-the listing
may be continued until it catalogues practically all the ills which beset
modem society. Groups in this category have several common char-
acteristics. Their programs usually include a variety of activities which
are not dependent upon governmental assistance. For instance, a mental
health association will conduct programs of general education aimed
at better public understanding of mental illness, volunteer services in
mental hospitals, and aid to research, clinics, or other medical services.
But while such activities are significant each of these groups has staked
out ultimate goals which cannot be attained by private resources alone.
If they are to maintain a dynamic program, they must continuously
seek enlightened intervention by governmental agencies.
For these groups the political restriction seldom results in loss of
charitable status. It is, however, an ever-present and frustrating factor
shaping methods of operation. Boards of directors are aware of the
potential penalty for a legislative program which is too substantial, a
term which they fear is frequently equated with the success of the
57. See TRuxrAN, Ti GovERNmrAI. PRocEss 3-13 (1951).
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program. 8 They find themselves in the anomalous position of speaking
with a hesitant, muted voice when every practical consideration requires
that their approach be forceful and clear.
Frequently the political limitation as it effects the programs of these
welfare groups requires an arbitrary classification. A mental health
association is organized to achieve the same ends as the heart, cancer,
and polio associations. Treatment and research in the latter fields is
located in the hospitals, universities, and drug companies. In contrast,
mental illness is almost the exclusive responsibility of state government.
If tax differences are to be drawn between these types of health agencies,
it must of necessity be on the basis of fortuities quite beyond the control
of the parties. A mental health association is only one of many possible
examples, and a projection into the future sees this problem becoming
increasingly aggravated. Government has preempted much of the
welfare field and is assuming an ever-expanding responsibility for edu-
cation and scientific research. The present law restricts charitable
groups from making a rational adjustment to this fact of contemporary
life. One example spotlights the irony of the situation. Relief of poverty
permits soup kitchens, almshouses, and orphan asylums but discourages
close cooperation between public and private agencies in working out
an enduring solution to the problem.
The second broad category of charities involved is composed of
groups which seek strengthening of governmental processes and insti-
tutions as an end in itself. The League of Women Voters and the
American Civil Liberties Union are prominent representatives of this
category. Other examples at the state and municipal level might include
such organizations as citizens for better courts, constitutional revision,
reapportionment, reform of county government, charter revision, and
so forth. While their motives are dedicated to the improvement of
man's position in society and while they conduct independent programs
of research and education, their ultimate goals have almost uniformly
been characterized as political, and tax privileges have accordingly been
withheld."9
58. Success of the operation is not part of the legal test of substantiality. It is, how-
ever, an important practical consideration. The more influential a group becomes the
more attention it draws to its activities, and the greater becomes the likelihood of its
being challenged by the Service.
59. However, the League of Women Voters has won some victories. See Liberty
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759, 766 (W.D. Ky. 1954):
In urging the citizenship within the area of its influence to qaanify as voters
[Vol. 46:439
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The effect need not be fatal to the organization's existence. Unlike
many of the welfare groups which require tax-free contributions to
support high cost programs of varied services, the reform groups de-
pend for much of their work upon the personal participation of their
members. The pinch is nonetheless there. Experience shows that sizeable
donations of a type necessary to sustain campaigns of public education
are not forthcoming unless they are deductible. In addition, charitable
status has come to symbolize stability and respectability. The defrocked
organization frequently finds itself at a disadvantage in recruiting mem-
bers and in obtaining the cooperation of other community agencies,
including the press, radio, and television.
B. A Democratic Society
Because the ultimate aims of the above groups are not being put to
challenge, it follows that there is something inherently improper in the
use of political means. To test the validity of this proposition requires
a brief inquiry into the role which these groups play as a part of a
functioning democracy.
Experts in the field of political institutions recognize that groups,
using the term in its most comprehensive sense to include business, labor,
trade, veterans, professional, and farm associations, are an important fact
to an understanding of governmental operations.'0 They arise as a
response to the individual's conviction that alone he is powerless to
shape public policy, and that only in association with persons who
share his viewpoint does he assume significant leverage. Assessments as to
whether this type of pluralistic distribution of power is beneficial or
inimical to the best interests of the community are too numerous to be
more than suggested here.
61
and to be informed upon the issues settled by exercise of the suffrage of the
electorate, the League has rendered invaluable services in the fight against care-
lessness and indifference in public affairs. If upon sporadic occasions the zeal of
its members has invaded the prohibited area of attempting to influence legislation,
this becomes of little consequence viewed against the background of the whole
of their efforts in behalf of better government.
See also Luther Ely Smith, 3 T.C. 696 (1944). In spite of these rulings, the League in
most sections of the country is not exempt, and members are advised that dues and
other contributions are not deductible.
60. The literature on the subject is voluminous. Two of the outstanding works are
TRUMAN, TiE Gov N FRqTrrAL PRocEss (1951) and KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE
GRoUPs (4th ed. 1958).
61. See TRuAuiA and KEY, op. cit. supra note 60, and references cited therein. Implica-
tions of the problem go beyond the single question of service or disservice to the
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Commentators have emphasized two serious deficiencies in contem-
porary democracy: the inability of decision-makers to keep abreast of
the varied and complex issues coming before them, and, as a product
of the system of geographical representation, the tendency of legislators
to respond to local rather than national interests. It is argued that the
existence of groups representating a multiplicity of interests works to
correct these defects by providing both a flow of information and
representation to interests which transcend geographical boundaries."
2
There is, on the other hand, a strong current of American thought which
views interest groups as a corrupting influence on the democratic process.
The democratic ideal assumes a legislator with all the facts making an
independent judgment. Groups, it is argued, supply distorted informa-
tion and frequently resort to coercive techniques, such as threats of
reprisals and bribes in the form of campaign contributions, which make
independent judgment impossible.
63
community. For instance, the author of a recent analysis of municipal government in
Philadelphia details the significant contributions made by reform and service groups.
He concludes, however, that the existence of such groups is a mixed blessing. His point
may be summed up in the following observation:
The flourishing American institution of service clubs is a perfect device for
political behavior that is at the same time outside of real politics. The service
clubs perform the subsidiary functions of managing charity, providing an outlet
for gregarious impulses, and giving their members a chance to make valuable
business contacts; but anyone who has observed their highly organized and ex-
tremely active hierarchies of administration, or participated in the parliamentary
debates of their conventions and local meetings, must be struck by the fact
that they are primarily instruments to enable their members to enjoy the sensa-
tions of government while incurring few of its responsibilities. The same can
probably be said for many veteran and fraternal organizations and for many
organizations of women in the United States. A great many members of the
service clubs before whom I have talked agree that the tragedy of the service
clubs is that they harness enormous political energies to the necessary but none-
theless secondary tasks of charity and community recreation, while leaving the
primary work of government to the frequently rn-equipped, ill-directed, and ill-
mannered party machines. REicHLY, TmE ART OF GovRNMENT 125 (1959).
62. This generalization is too simple and overdrawn to represent the views of any
one person. For an incisive evaluation of the place of groups in American democracy
see TRUMAN, op. cit. supra note 60, 501-35. Of the many statements as to the need for
decision-makers to be kept informed one by Walter Lippmann is representative. "I
argue that representative government . . . cannot be worked successfully, no matter
\vhat the basis of election, unless there is an independent, expert organization for mak-
ing the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions." Liupm N,
PUBLIC OPrmoN 31 (1922).
63. This attitude has been strongly held throughout American history. See TRuMAN,
op. cit. supra note 60, 3-13. It is periodically recharged by such episodes as the offer
of a $2,500 campaign contribution to Senator Francis Case of South Dakota in 1956
fot an affirmative vote on the natural gas bill which was then before the Senate. President
456
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When the inquiry narrows to those groups which are organized for
charitable objectives, the specter of the corrupt lobbyist and unscrupu-
lous tactics is removed. Charity requires ethical standards in the pursuit
of selfless ends. For those who take advocacy beyond the bounds of
propriety, there is an immediate sanction in the form of the withdrawal
of charitable privileges. The problem at this point becomes relatively
simple if we further limit our focus to those charitable groups who
seek objectives about which there is no taint of controversy. Here the
use of political means serves both charitable and democratic goals. It
broadens the democratic base by recruiting, in the formulation of policy,
the participation of persons who otherwise would remain passive; it
provides a forum for an exchange of ideas and the evolution of re-
sponsible policies; and it keeps governmental authorities alert to new
and creative approaches to age-old problems."4
Reservations arise when we postulate purposes which, while charitable,
evoke sharply divergent public reactions. Birth control, court reorgan-
ization, and fluoridation of drinking water might serve as examples. The
Eisenhower vetoed the bill because of such "arrogant" tactics. 102 CoNG. Rac. 2793,
2897-98 (1956). The story is well told in Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax
Incentives for Small Contributors, 18 LA. L. REv. 414 (1958). The force of this attitude
is apparent in such attempts at regulating lobbying as the Federal Regulation of Lobby-
ing Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958). See Note, Improving the Legislative Process:
Federal Regulation of Lobbying, 56 YAia L.J. 304 (1947).
64. A recent survey of charitable trusts in England has described the contributions
of voluntary groups in the following terms:
When we turn from voluntary service as such to consider the place of voluntary
organizations in the modem social structure more complex considerations arise.
The advantage of voluntary effort over state activity lies in its greater flexibility;
its ability to set new standards or to undertake new work of its own volition,
and without seeking fresh statutory powers; its ability to pioneer; to make ad-
ditional or more special provision for people suffering from certain types of dis-
advantages or disabilities; or for young people of exceptional promise; to work
outwards from the individual in need of help to the services he needs rather
than by the reverse process of discovering the individual in providing a service
(we have in mind particularly the case work agencies); to attract to it men and
women with a high sense of dedication ready and willing to give themselves to
taxing and specially difficult work. We will not enlarge on these virtues, which
few would deny. Some of the most valuable activities of voluntary societies
consist, however, in the fact that they are able to stand aside from and criticise
state action, or inaction, in the interests of the inarticulate inan-in-the-street. This
may take the form of helping individuals to know and obtain their rights. It
also consists in a more general activity of collecting data about some point where
the shoe seems to pinch or a need remains unmet. The general machinery of
democratic agitation, deputations, letters to the Press, questions in the House,
conferences and the rest of it, may then be put into operation in order to con-
vince a wider public that action is necessary. Committee on Law and Practice,
Report Relating to Charitable Trusts, CrM. No. 8710, 13 (1952) (Nathan Report).
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need for information and ideas is not diminished because the issue is
controversial. But in the interests of a proper functioning of the demo-
cratic process, it is necessary that the flow of information and ideas
either be broadly representative of the entire community's attitude or,
in the alternative, that there be equal opportunity for presentation of
contrary viewpoints.
It is obvious that tax deductions are not equally available to every
citizen. Statistics indicate that approximately twenty-five per cent
of the taxpayers itemize their deductions.65 Only within this group is
a tax incentive for charitable giving meaningful. And with the estate
and gift taxes, which are applicable to a very small segment of the
population, the distortion is even more pronounced.68 In addition, as a
consequence of the graduated rate structure, the high bracket taxpayer is
able to deduct a much greater proportion of his contributions than
the less well endowed citizen.1 A system weighed so heavily in favor
of the wealthy would seem to be productive of philosophies associated
only with the well-to-do.
There can be little doubt that considerations of this kind have had
an important influence on the evolution of the present law. The
authors of the 1934 legislation were primarily concerned about the
enterprise which, under the guise of charity, was designed to promote
private economic interests. It is, however, quite another thing to con-
clude, as the authors of the legislation in effect did, that the potential
for selfish enterprises sweeps every other consideration before it. For
the majority of welfare and governmental reform issues, economic in-
terests do not dictate a "party line." Such traditional labels as "liberal"
and "conservative" do not help in explaining public concern for the
poor, the sick, or the malfunctioning governmental institution, nor do
65. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1953 pt. 1, at 6 (1957).
66. With the various exemptions and the marital deduction privileges only a very
small precentage of persons is effected by these taxes. See BirKER, FEDERAL INCOME
ESTATE AND Gi TAXATION 807-22 (2d ed. 1958); WARREN & SuRREY, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GrFT TAxATION 10-13 (1956).
67. "A low bracket taxpayer who donates a deductible $100 is contributing $80 of
his own money and $20 of Uncle Sam's; these figures reverse in the high income
brackets." Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incentives for Small Contributors,
18 LA. L. REv. 414, 428 (1958). This disparity in opportunity has been noted, for
instance, by Judge William Clark, dissenting in Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941). "Undoubtedly, however, there is a faint odor of harm in
the use of money to represent only one side on any proposition. To paraphrase, it
may place the Lord on the side of the heaviest money-bags." Id. at 114.
[Vol. 46:439
HeinOnline -- 46 Va. L. Rev.  458 1960
Lhnitation on Political Activities
they provide a basis for prediction as to attitudes and policies which a
civic organization will sponsor.
Corrective forces are at work in every organization tending to
ameliorate the highly individualistic prejudices of particular members.
In order to maximize its influence, a group will consciously strive to
broaden its membership base. Policy and program are shaped in a
setting which, although in miniature, is not dissimilar from the legis-
lature. A range of differing points of view must be accommodated if
the group is to keep its cohesion. "Thus the leaders of the Parent-
Teacher Association must take some account of the fact that their pro-
posals must be acceptable to members who also belong to the local
taxpayers' league, to the local chamber of commerce, and to the
Catholic Church." o
Democratic principles further require that tax privileges do not
operate to favor one side in a controversy. It is a weakness of the
present law that such discrimination does occur. A large charity may
engage in political activity so long as that activity is insubstantial in
comparison with the charity's other activities. In Connecticut the
Catholic Church is largely credited with blocking any modification of
the local law making the use of any contraceptive device subject to
criminal penalties. 9 While in an absolute sense this activity is sub-
stantial, it is obviously but an insignificant part of the Church's overall
activities and in no way threatens its tax status. A birth control league
sounding an opposition voice, however, will receive no such advantages
from the Treasury.
A relaxation of existing restraints could effect an adjustment of such
discriminations. It does not, however, follow that a millennium will
result whereby all viewpoints are heard in equal debate with government
free to select the soundest course. The problem is blown up beyond
its practical significance. Welfare and reform issues divide citizens
68. TRuMiAN, op. cit. supra note 60, at 509. See also KEY, op. cit. supra note 60, at
166-67.
69. CoN. Gms. STAT. 1Ev. § 53-32 (1958). By using this one example the author
does not intend to suggest that the Catholic Church is the only religious body taking
political positions. On the role of organized religion in politics see KEY, op. cit. supra
note 60, at 130-34. See generally PFEFFER, CIURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOm (1953). On the
general problem of "tax equilibrium" (equality of opportunity in receiving tax deduc-
tions) see the incisive analysis of the related area of business expense deductions for
lobbying expenditures appearing in Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income
Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. REv. 365, 376-80 (1959). See
also Note, Deductibility of Expenses to Influence Legislation, 46 VA. L. REv. 112 (1960).
1960]
HeinOnline -- 46 Va. L. Rev.  459 1960
460 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 46:439
into those who favor innovation and those who oppose it. The burden is
invariably upon the former, and rare indeed is the situation in which the
forces of the status quo are under-represented.
C. The Treasury7"
The factors which have shaped the political activities restriction come
into focus when the problem is viewed from the perspective of the
Treasury. To the collector of the taxes and the guardian of the tax
law, political theorizing is irrelevant. It is concerned on two counts with
tax support of controversial issues. First, it does not want the un-
enviable task of selecting those political purposes which are compatible
with charitable principles and rejecting those which are not. Within
the last decade two congressional committees have demonstrated par-
ticular interest in the political outlook of tax-fee charities.7 1 Under-
standably, there is no desire to provoke the sleeping lion once again.
Secondly, the Treasury must replace those tax losses resulting from
deductions out of other taxes without destroying public confidence in
the integrity of the system. It is obviously difficult to justify a tax
subsidy for a political purpose with which a considerable segment of
the population is out of sympathy.
These considerations cannot be dismissed with the accusation that the
Treasury is trying to sweep a difficult problem under the carpet. A
few of the possibilities include: birth control-an issue so explosive
that it may well decide the outcome of a presidential election; fluorida-
tion of water-an issue which has torn a number of communities asunder,
each competing group claiming to have the true scientific, ethical, and
religious word; segregated schools-an issue on which approximately
one-third of the nation is already in open revolt against federal au-
thority. Moreover, the elements of controversy are not always ap-
parent from the statement of purpose. If good government leagues were
70. The author, of course, has no authority to speak for the Treasury. The assumed
difficulties of administration have always been of major concern. See, for instance,
the remarks of Senator La Follette at the time of the enactment of the 1934 legislation.
78 CoNG. RE.c 5959 (1934).
71. Special Comm. To Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organ-
izations, Report on Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, H.R.
Re. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) (Reece Committee); Select Comm. To In-
vestigate Foundations, Final Report, H.R. REP. No. 2514, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953)
(Cox Committee). For contrasting studies of the work of these committees compare
MAcDONALD, THE FoRD FOUNDATION 19-35 (1956), with WORMSER, FouNDAONS: THEIR
PowER Am INFLUENcE (1958).
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to become charitable, what of such a league if it is a front for known
communists? What if it is organized by the loyal disciples of such
anathemas to the liberal or conservative segments of American society
as Senator McCarthy on the one hand and Walter Reuther on the
other?7" A recent Supreme Court decision held, in another context,
that a blanket restriction on deductions for political activities does not
present the constitutional issue of a denial of free speech.75 If, however,
such deductions were generally allowed, an administrative process which
appears to discriminate on the basis of the degree of controversy in-
volved might place the constitutional issue in a different light. 4
The Treasury originated the restriction against political activities, and
its view has prevailed without serious challenge. This fact explains
why the law is written in blacks and whites and why the one exception
to it is defined in terms of amount, rather than kinds of activity.
Is A CHANGE IN THE LA-w PossBLE?
It has been apparent that this writer favors relaxation of the restric-
tion. Solicitude for the Treasury's position cannot alter the fact that
the existing law arbitrarily discriminates against many worthwhile en-
terprises only because of the alleged administrative difficulties in separat-
ing the good from the bad. Throughout the law lines must be drawn. If
decision-makers give way to the fear of what-might-be, the law be-
comes paralyzed and ineffective as an instrument of social control.
Or, to echo an English judge: "[I] t is not a valid objection to a legal
doctrine that it will not be always easy to know whether the doctrine
72. It might be argued today that the test of substantiality as used in the cases
becomes increasingly strict as the political objective in issue becomes more con-
troversial. Certainly purposes which do not coincide with widely prevailing attitudes
are given short shrift. See Sharpe's Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1945);
Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1945); Anita McCormick Blaine, 22
T.C. 1195 (1954). If the present restrictions were to be removed the purpose would
still have to qualify as charitable. This would exclude support of parties and candidates
and purposes which require allegiance to a foreign power or antisocial attitudes such
as anti-Semitism and the like. Within these limits varying degrees of liberalism or
conservatism would be irrelevant.
73. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); see Sunderland, Taxation of
Free Speech, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 109 (1958) (pre-Cammarano); Note, Deductibility of
Expenses To Influence Legislatio7, 46 VA. L. REv. 112 (1960) (post-Caimnarano).
74. "It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engag-
ing in speech is a limitation on free speech." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518
(1957).
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is to be applied in a particular case. The law has to face such embarrass-
ments." 7
Even if the present law were to be totally abrogated, tax privileges
would only be granted to activities which are charitable, as opposed to
those which are private, selfish, or against public policy. And sound
policy suggests that the charitable category should continue to exclude
partisan support of parties and candidates." The objections to liberalizing
the law become less persuasive when viewed in light of the fact that the
federal and state taxing authorities are already making just these kinds of
decisions in cases which do not present issues of political activity. Tax
privileges are allowed to schools which discriminate against Negroes,7"
to competing religious sects," to birth control clinics,79 to privately
endowed dental schools which undoubtedly include, among other re-
search projects, studies of water fluoridation, and, even occasionally, to
a controversial reform movement.80 Obviously these activities do not
75. Dashwood v. Maginac, [1891) 3 Ch. 306, 364 (C.A.) (Bowen, L.J.). For a
collection of similar statements see Williams, Language and the Law-11, 61 L.Q. REv.
179, 184-85 (1945).
76. In this manner private and tax law definitions are kept in harmony. See note 44
supra. This is not to say that a persuasive argument in favor of tax incentives for
political contributions cannot be made without justifying such privileges as charitable.
See Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incentives for Small Contributors, 18
LA. L. REV. 414 (1958).
77. In the recently concluded litigation concerning Girard College, the extensive tax
exemptions (primarily local property taxes) accorded the college were argued as a
basis for prohibited state action under the fourteenth amendment. This specific point
was largely ignored in the decisions. See Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287
(1956) (discrimination under a will not actionable even though an agency of the City
of Philadelphia was acting as trustee), rev'd sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors
of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (city's participation as trustee prohibited state
action); Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958) (city board
reconstituted as private agency, discrimination under will continued), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 570 (1958). For a discussion of tax exemptions as a basis of state action see
the opinions of Judge Musmanno, dissenting to the several decisions of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Girard, supra. On state discrimination and tax exemptions see also
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 981 (1950). Direct subsidies to private discrimination are, however, prohibited
state action. See Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
78. See 4 Sco-rr, TausTs § 371 (2d. ed. 1956) and the cases collected therein. See
also note 9 supra.
79. Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1940); cf. Slee v. Commissioner,
42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). The Albert and Mary Lasker Foundation for medical
research, including planned parenthood, is listed as qualified to receive deductible con-
tributions. INTERNAL REvENuE SERvIcE, C ULATIVE LisT oF ORGANiZATIO NS 146 (1957).
80. The Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, Inc., of New York City, organized "to
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have the approval of every section of society. The dissenters are taxed,
nevertheless, to cover the loss of revenue occasioned by these subsidies.
The problems raised by the controversial purpose are substantial, but
they are general to the field of deductions, not specific to one small
corner of it."'
Free speech objections to the process of selection are not well-
founded. Charitable status is a rational classification for permitting or
denying tax privileges.82 More serious constitutional questions, those
presented by the discriminatory trust under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment 3 and by the religious trust under the
separation principle of the first amendment, 4 have been warily avoided
by the Supreme Court. It seems highly unlikely that the Court at
some future time will be looking to compound these problems.
But ultimately any proposals for amending the law must take into
account what, as a practical matter, can be obtained. As the Supreme
Court recently has indicated, there is no constitutional basis on which
to invalidate the political activities section of the statute.8 5 The case
upheld the Treasury regulation which provides that no business deduc-
tion shall be allowed for sums of money expended to defeat legislation,
even though that legislation would seriously affect the taxpayer's busi-
keep before the public the ideas of Henry George," is listed as a charitable organiza-
tion entitled to receive tax deductible contributions. Id. at 226; cf. Sharpe's Estate v.
Commissioner, 148 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1945).
81. Although there is presently no discernible agitation for reform, it seems inevitable
that at some future time there will be either a legislative or judicial reappraisal of tax
privileges for organizations which actively discriminate against certain segments of
society. There is also the problem of tax loss through deductions and exemptions. See
note 93 infra. There have been a few voices over the years suggesting that govern-
ment may be able to do the job better. "But it has been obvious, at least since the
days of the Tudors, that, from the fiscal point of view, taxation is a more satisfactory
expedient than exhortations to private beneficence. It is also certain that it is likely
to be a more efficient method of reducing inequality than the encouragement of
philanthropic bequests." WEDGWvOOD, THE EcoNoMics oF INmHRITANcE 91 (1929).
82. This assumption underlies the whole structure of deductions and exemptions
and is not now open to question. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden De Predicadores,
263 U.S. 578 (1924) (1913 federal income tax); University v. People, 99 U.S. 309
(1878) (state taxes).
83. For a discussion of this issue see Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YAxe LJ. 979, 1001 (1957).
84. See PFEFFR, CnUcui, STArE, AND FXEDOX 183-91 (1953); Katz, Freedom of
Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426, 432-33 (1953); Paulsen, Prefer-
ment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PaoB.
144, 148-52 (1949).
85. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959).
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ness.86 As a part of its holding, the Court, quoting with approval from
the Slee case,87 cited the restriction upon charities as representing a
"sharply defined policy" which the Treasury could legitimately carry
over into the field of business deductions.88 Nor is there any likelihood
that Congress, particularly after a record of consistent success before
the courts, will be in a mood to reexamine the question.89
With judicial and legislative reform ruled out, the only avenue open
is a general plea to the Treasury for a flexible administration of existing
law. The key remains the word "substantial," a term which does not de-
fine its own limits. In interpreting this word it would be consistent
with the history and policy of the statute to strike aggressively at
political activities which are selfishly conceived for personal advantage,
but to maintain a strong presumption in favor of the activities of genuine
charities. The Seasongood ° ruling suggests a workable approach to the
problem, with particular reference to three points contained therein.
First, the case inferentially denies the validity of the distinction between
organizations which seek legislative ends as a primary goal and those
which engage in political activity as a secondary part of their programs.
Second, it confines the scope of prohibited activity to direct representa-
tions to governmental officials, an interpretation which finds further
support in the Supreme Court's ruling upholding the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act as thus limited.91 And third, as a corollary of the
other two, it defines permissible education broadly to include the
general education of the public to the need for governmental reform.
The section of the new regulations on education gives reason to
hope that progress can be made in this direction and that the unnecessary
rigidities of the previous law, which are continued in the definition of
an action group, can be deemphasized. The Treasury might need
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6435, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No.
4, at 7.
87. See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text.
88. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512 (1959).
89. The trend in Congress has not been to encourage greater expenditures of money
for political activities. Although the subject matter and policy issues involved are
clearly distinguishable from the present question, the vote of the Senate on January
25, 1960, tightening up the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, is perhaps indicative of the
temper of the times. S. 2436, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. R~c. 1067 (daily ed. Jan.
25, 1960); N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1960, p. 1, col. 3.
90. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
91. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620-21 (1954).
92. Treas Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (c) (3) (1959) (definition of an "action organization");
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (1959) (definition of education).
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additional controls for protection against frequent demands brought by
insubstantial, temporary action committees. And it is conceivable that
standards might be developed calling for a period of probation, a
minimum number of adherents, and a record of past activity, which
demonstrates that the viewpoint of the association has been fairly repre-
sented to the public.
CONCLUSION
The story of the restriction on political activities is instructive on the
feasibility of applying legal controls in the field of philanthropy. The
stakes are substantial. On the one hand, society has a vital interest in
protecting the tax base from further erosion through deductions. 3 While
a reversal of the law on political activities would result in an insignificant
drain on federal revenues, it might, however, have repercussions in
other areas of tax law. Much that has been argued here can be applied
in favor of the deductibility of lobbying costs as business expenses,
94
or of a credit for contributions to political parties and candidates."
On the other hand, there is society's interest in preserving charity as a
dynamic institution. There are already potent forces tending to make
charity overly timid." If charity is to meet the challenge of the future,
it must be prepared to strike out boldly, to experiment and lead in ways
which are not open to government.
97
93. See Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1957).
The author estimates that individuals deducted 4.4 billion dollars for charitable con-
tributions against their 1956 income taxes. Very few studies have been made of the
total impact of charitable giving on state and federal revenues. Isolated references
include: ADLER, TAx ExEmPTIONs oN REAL ESTATE 91-99 (1922); Stimson, The Exemp-
tion of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MiNN. L. RPv. 411 (1934).
94. See Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions for
Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. REv. 365 (1959); Spiegel, Deductibility of Lobbying,
Initiative and Referendum Expenses: A Problem for Congressional Consideration, 45
CALU. L. REv. 1 (1957).
95. See Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incentives for Small Contributors,
18 LA. L. REv. 414 (1958).
96. See MACDONALD, THE FoRD FOUN DATN 165-74 (1956); Embree, Timid Billions,
Harper's, March, 1949, p. 28.
97. The justification of philanthropy as venture capital, free to move into areas
where government fears to tread, has been expressed many times. The statement of
Henry Ford II to the Cox Committee is representative. "We believe that foundations,
by and large, provide what some one has called the venture capital of philanthropy ....
To do so they must from time to time pioneer, underwrite experiments, and encourage
programs and projects that might otherwise never have a chance." Hearings Before
the Select House Committee To Investigate Foundations and Other Organizations, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1952).
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Controls are an obstacle to this kind of growth. So it is that the
restriction on political activities illustrates all the difficulties of attempt-
ing to fashion one rule to cover an infinite variety of dissimilar situations.
It deprives society of aid and leadership in the field of government; its
administration is inevitably arbitrary and discriminatory; and, as the
trend toward the welfare state continues apace, it presages a steady
shrinking of areas open to charity.
Is it not probable that the picture of people acting in irrational and
antisocial ways has been greatly overdrawn? Charity has prospered
free of legal controls in the past. Its stability has been maintained be-
cause men of goodwill, without thought of personal advantage, have
sought to benefit society in ways that society may approve. The
Treasury should take cognizance of this tradition by giving a flexible
interpretation to the present law.
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